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ABSTRACT—The fact that a substantial percentage of Supreme Court 
decisions are unanimous is often used to undermine the theory that the 
Court’s decisions are ideologically driven. We argue that if the ideological 
stakes in a case are small, even slight dissent aversion is likely to produce a 
unanimous decision. The data support this interpretation but also establish 
the existence of an ideological effect in unanimous decisions. These 
findings are consistent with a realistic conception of the Court as a mixed 
ideological–legalistic judicial institution. 
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The Supreme Court is widely regarded, and not only by political 
scientists, as a highly political Court, an impression often reinforced by the 
ferocious dissents of one or more Justices in many cases. This makes the 
Court’s unanimous decisions an important subject for study—for how is 
unanimity achieved in a political court?—and it is a subject that has been 
neglected.1 This Essay seeks to advance understanding of the phenomenon 
of Supreme Court unanimity. Despite the title of the symposium, this is not 
an essay about Justice Stevens as such, but it is not irrelevant to his service 
on the Court. He was noted for frequent dissents.2 Of the Justices who 
served in the 2005 through 2009 Terms3 (the years of the Roberts Court 
before Justice Stevens retired), he had the highest dissent rate—30.3% of 
the 320 cases in which he participated (Justice Souter was second, at 
27.2%—69/254).4 Yet he voted more often to join a unanimous decision 
than he voted to dissent—39.1% of the votes he cast were in unanimous 
decisions (125/320). Whether this should be thought paradoxical is one of 
the questions we try to answer in this Essay. 
The Supreme Court Database (also known as the Spaeth Database) 
contains data on cases decided since the 1946 Term (the last Term we study 
is the 2009 Term). We define unanimous decisions as ones in which no 
Justice dissented, even if there were also one or more concurring opinions. 
Concurring opinions are actually more common in unanimous decisions 
than in non-unanimous ones—41% of the unanimous decisions in The 
Supreme Court Database include concurring opinions, compared to 38% for 
non-unanimous decisions—although the reason may be arithmetical: in a 5–
4 decision, the maximum number of concurring opinions is four; in a 9–0 
decision it is eight. An alternative definition of a unanimous decision—
which would be more realistic in recognizing that concurring opinions often 
indicate disagreement with, rather than merely supplementation or 
extension of, the majority opinion—would be a decision in which all the 
 
1  But see Saul Brenner & Theodore S. Arrington, Unanimous Decision Making on the U.S. Supreme 
Court: Case Stimuli and Judicial Attitudes, 9 POL. BEHAV. 75 (1987); Paul H. Edelman, David E. Klein 
& Stefanie A. Lindquist, Consensus, Disorder, and Ideology on the Supreme Court, 9 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 129 (2012); Thomas R. Hensley & Scott P. Johnson, Unanimity on the Rehnquist Court, 
31 AKRON L. REV. 387 (1998); Pamela C. Corley, Amy Steigerwalt & Artemus Ward, Deciding To 
Agree: Explaining Consensual Behavior on the United States Supreme Court (Apr. 3–6, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association), available at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/6/1/1/
pages266111/p266111-1.php. 
2  See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism, and John Paul Stevens, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: 
UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 157, 157 (Earl M. Maltz ed. 2003) (referring to Justice Stevens 
as the “Court’s leading dissenter”); Jeffrey A. Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 23, 2007, 
at 50, 52. 
3  Excluding Justice O’Connor, who retired in January 2006. 
4  These percentages exclude cases in which one or more Justices did not sit. The source of our 
statistics, unless otherwise indicated, is THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://www.
supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited May 29, 2012), sometimes called the “Spaeth database.” 
106:699  (2012) Even Unanimous Decisions 
 701 
Justices joined the majority opinion, whether or not any of them also wrote 
a concurring opinion. We have not broken down the data sufficiently to 
enable us to analyze unanimous decisions so defined. 
Except in the 1969 Term, in which there were only eight Justices, we 
exclude unanimous cases in which one or more Justice was absent; the 
reason is that we cannot be certain that if a ninth Justice had sat, the case 
would still have been decided unanimously. 
Under our definition, about 30% of the Court’s orally argued decisions 
from 1946–2009 were decided unanimously. Figure 1 shows that the 
percentage has been trending upward: from 21% in 1946–1952 (the Vinson 
Court) to 34% since 2005 (the Roberts Court). The graph shows that part of 
the upward trend is the result of an increasing fraction of unanimous 
decisions reversing the Ninth Circuit.5 Over the entire period, about 73% of 
Ninth Circuit decisions that the Supreme Court reviewed were reversed 
unanimously, compared to 63% for the other circuits. If we exclude them, 
the upward trend falls from 1.35% to 1.07% per year.6 Even if the decisions 
reversing the Ninth Circuit are included, there is no significant positive 
trend over the last twenty-five years (since Rehnquist’s first Term as Chief 
Justice). The percentage peaked in 1997 at 51.1% (40.2% if excluding 
Ninth Circuit reversals) and has since declined to 37%. 
 
5  Between the 1946 and 2009 Terms, about 73% of decisions by the Ninth Circuit that the Supreme 
Court reviewed were reversed unanimously, compared to 63% for the other circuits. On the “rogue” 
character of the Ninth Circuit, see Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study 
of Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 711 (2000). 
6  We regressed the logarithm of the percentage of unanimous decisions (with and without 
unanimous reversals of the Ninth Circuit) against time. The coefficients (and t-ratios) were .014 (5.23) 
and .011 (4.20) and were significantly different from each other. 
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Because of the Supreme Court’s ideological divisions, the percentage 
of unanimous decisions might seem inexplicable unless Supreme Court 
Justices have strong dissent aversion, which they used to,7 but no longer 
do.8 Another explanation is that unanimous decisions are limited to cases 
that do not present ideological issues. A third possible explanation 
combines the first two: the ideological stakes are small in cases that are 
candidates for being decided unanimously, so even slight dissent aversion 
will generate a unanimous decision in cases in which the ideological stakes 
are low. A fourth explanation, which seems the most plausible, adds to the 
third that when the ideological stakes are small, a combination of dissent 
aversion with legalistic commitments is likely to override the ideological 
preferences of the Justices.9 Supreme Court Justices are not plausibly 
regarded as completely indifferent to such legalistic norms as stare decisis; 
a rampant disregard of precedent would unsettle the law and reduce the 
 
7  See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362 (2001); Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as 
Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 1267 (2001). 
8  See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note †, ch. 6. 
9  We derive this explanation from two papers. See Edelman, Klein & Lindquist, supra note 1; Paul 
H. Edelman, David E. Klein & Stefanie A Lindqust, Measuring Deviations from Expected Voting 
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authority of the Justices by making them seem just politicians in robes.10 
(This doesn’t necessarily mean they “believe” these norms in some strong 
sense; they may just find them useful.) We predict, therefore, that few 
decisions overruling precedents will be unanimous (though Brown v. Board 
of Education11 is a famous example of such unanimity) because it would 
require a strong ideological conviction to override a commitment to stare 
decisis.12 
This prediction is supported by Table 1, which compares the number of 
unanimous and non-unanimous Supreme Court decisions that “formally 
alter” a Supreme Court precedent. The data come from the Spaeth (U.S. 
Supreme Court) database; decisions are coded as formally altering 
precedent if they state that they are overruling a decision or use equivalent 
language such as that the decision is “disapproved” or is “no longer good 
law.” 














Alters Precedent 33 1.6 106 2.4 
Doesn’t Alter 
Precedent 
2017 98.4 4382 97.6 
Total 2050 100.0 4488 100.0 
 
 Precedent Alteration No Precedent Alteration 
Unanimous/ 
Non-unanimous 
No. Cases Percent No. Cases Percent 
Unanimous 33 23.7 2017 31.5 
Non-unanimous 106 76.3 4382 68.5 
Total Cases 139 100.0 6399 100.0 
Note: Cells include only cases in which all nine Justices voted, except in the 1968 
Term, when there were only eight participating Justices. 
 
Notice that only 1.6% of unanimous cases alter precedent, while 2.4% 
of non-unanimous ones do. Another way to see the difference is that 23.7% 
of cases in which precedent is altered are unanimous, whereas 31.5% of 
cases in which precedent is not altered are unanimous. 
 
10  See Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 1021–22 
(1996). 
11  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
12  The articles cited supra note 9 also find that “disordered voting” (voting against the ideological 
grain) is unlikely in cases that overrule decisions of the Court. 
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We can derive additional indirect evidence of the ideological stakes in 
unanimous Supreme Court decisions from the nature of the case (such as 
whether it is a civil liberties case or a tax case) and from the presence or 
absence of a dissent in the lower court. To this end we estimate the 
following regression equation for the probability of a unanimous decision 
(Pu): 
Pu = f(Dissent, Reversal, CA-Conflict, Other-Conflict, Non-Ideological, 
Ninth Circuit, Chief, Subject Area, u) 
where Dissent = 1 if the Supreme Court’s opinion notes that there was a 
dissent in the court below (Dissent = 0 otherwise),13 Reversal = 1 if the 
Supreme Court reversed the lower court, CA-Conflict = 1 if the Court 
mentioned a conflict among federal courts of appeals on the issue on which 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, Other-Conflict = 1 if there was a 
conflict between other courts or between a federal court (or courts) of 
appeals and a state court or courts,14 Non-Ideological = 1 if the ideological 
direction of the Supreme Court decision could not be specified, and Ninth 
Circuit = 1 if the case came from the Ninth Circuit. Chief is a set of dummy 
variables for the Terms of the five Chief Justices in our sample (Chief 
Justices Vinson, Warren, Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts, with Chief 
Justice Vinson as the omitted variable), Subject Area comprises separate 
dummy variables for civil liberties, economics, and judicial power cases 
(the omitted category, which accounts for fewer than 6% of our sample 
cases, consists mainly of federalism cases). Table 2 lists the variables (and 
their means) in the regressions. 
 
13  The Dissent variable in THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE represents whether the majority 
opinion mentions that there was a dissent in the lower court. Generally it does, especially when 
reversing, and most decisions by the Supreme Court are reversals. Still, we are probably underestimating 
the number of lower court opinions in which there was a dissent. 
14  1336 (87%) of the 1535 conflict cases involve conflicts among the courts of appeals. We exclude 
cases from the Federal Circuit. The remaining 199 cases mainly involve conflicts between a federal 
court and a state court or between state courts. 
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TABLE 2: VARIABLES IN REGRESSIONS ON UNANIMOUS DECISIONS, 1946–2009 TERMS 
 Mean (Standard Deviation) 
Variables All Unanimous Only 
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Non-Ideological: Ideological direction of Supreme 





Ninth Circuit: Case from Ninth Circuit, coded 1 (yes) 
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Fraction Republican: Fraction of Justices appointed by 





Civil Liberties: (Adjusted) Civil liberties case, coded 1 
(yes) or 0 (no). Includes criminal procedure, civil 






Economics: Economics case, coded 1 (yes) or 0 (no). 
















Number of observations 7184 1728 
Notes: 
(1) All regressions are limited to orally argued cases. 
(2) There are only 6020 observations in the regression that include the conflict variables 
because no information on conflicts is available for the remaining 1164 decisions. 
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We predict a negative coefficient on the Dissent variable and positive 
coefficients on the Reversal, CA-Conflict, and Non-Ideological variables. A 
dissent in the lower court suggests that the case probably has significant 
ideological stakes; if the stakes had been insignificant, the lower court 
probably would have been unanimous (even if the panel was ideologically 
mixed), owing to the strong dissent aversion that we also find in the federal 
courts of appeals.15 But we have not studied dissent aversion in state 
supreme courts,16 and many U.S. Supreme Court decisions are decisions on 
appeal from such courts. 
A unanimous decision is also more likely when the Court reverses 
rather than affirms, because some reversals are motivated just by error 
correction—to keep the lower courts in line on what may be technical 
issues with slight or no ideological stakes. The Court would have little 
reason to affirm a case involving a technical issue that the court of appeals 
had decided correctly unless there was an intercircuit conflict (CA-Conflict). 
The Court feels some obligation to resolve such conflicts even if they do 
not present challenging issues—which are issues that are likely to be 
ideologically charged—and so neither affirmances nor reversals in 
intercircuit conflict cases are as likely to be ideologically motivated as other 
Supreme Court decisions. Conflicts represented by the Other-Conflict 
variable are less likely to involve technical issues, so we expect this 
variable to have a weaker effect on the likelihood of a unanimous decision 
than the CA-Conflict variable. 
Slightly more than one percent of the cases in our sample (75 out of 
7184) could not be classified as either conservative or liberal, suggesting 
that ideological issues were not salient; so we expect those cases to be 
disproportionately decided unanimously. 
We expect a positive coefficient on the Ninth Circuit variable because 
of the large number of unanimous reversals of Ninth Circuit cases. And 
since ideology is expected to play a larger role in civil liberties cases than in 
the other subject matter areas, we predict a negative relation between the 
civil liberties variable and the likelihood of a unanimous decision, and 
likewise in the judicial power category, which includes cases involving 
standing, mootness, comity, review of federal administrative agency 
decisions, the act of state doctrine, and other subject areas in which often 
there are ideological stakes, though smaller ones than in civil liberties cases. 
The positive trend in the fraction of unanimous decisions should yield 
positive coefficients on the Chief dummy variables (since Chief Justice 
Vinson, who was Chief Justice when the unanimity rate was lowest, is the 
omitted Chief variable). The effect should be largest for the Rehnquist and 
 
15  See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note †, ch. 6.  
16  A recent study estimates that there is at least one dissent in about 22% of all state supreme court 
decisions. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reversal, Dissent, and Variability in State 
Supreme Courts: The Centrality of Jurisdictional Source, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1451, 1482 (2009). 
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Roberts Courts in view of the sharp increase in the fraction of unanimous 
decisions in the last twenty-five years.17 
The regression results in Table 3 support most of our predictions.18 
Dissent has a negative and highly significant effect in both equations. A 
lower court dissent produces a .068 decline in the probability of a 
unanimous decision (that is, a 23% decline relative to the mean probability 
of a unanimous decision, .29, when there is no dissent). Both Reversal and 
CA-Conflict have positive and highly significant effects on unanimity; a 
reversal and a conflict in the lower courts raise the probability of a 
unanimous decision by .054 and .057 respectively (19% and 20% relative to 
the mean of .285). Other-Conflict is not significant, which is not surprising 
since we have no information on whether other conflicts involve non-
ideological issues. Non-Ideological and Ninth Circuit are also not 
significant. 
The predicted probability of a unanimous decision is lower in civil 
liberties cases than in judicial power cases (21% and 36%, respectively), as 
is to be expected, since civil liberties is a more ideologically charged field. 
In addition, cases are more likely to be decided unanimously by both the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts than by the Burger, Warren, or Vinson 
Courts. 
 
17  We experimented with two other variables: a rough measure of ideological uniformity of the 
Court each Term and the Court’s caseload. Neither was close to being statistically significant and neither 
affected the magnitude or significance of the other variables. 
18  Equations (1) and (2) are nearly identical, except that (2) includes the two conflict variables and 
contains fewer observations (6020 instead of 7184). The information on lower court conflicts is based on 
the reasons the majority opinion gave for granting certiorari. In 1164 cases no reason was given. 
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TABLE 3: LOGIT ANALYSIS OF THE PROBABILITY OF A UNANIMOUS DECISION, 1946–2009 
TERMS 
 Probability of Unanimous Decision 































































Number of Observations                7184                6020 
Notes: 
(1) *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01. 
(2) The entries are marginal-effect coefficients at the mean values of all variables. 
(3) Federalism (and Miscellaneous) is the omitted case category. 
(4) Standard errors are adjusted by clustering on Term of Court (64 clusters, 1 for each 
Term). 
 
If we add a dummy variable for whether the case was decided in a per 
curiam opinion rather than a signed opinion, the positive coefficient on the 
judicial power variable is no longer statistically significant. A 
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disproportionate number of judicial power cases are decided per curiam—
23%, versus only 5% for all other subject areas (on average), and per 
curiam decisions, even in orally argued cases (for our sample is limited to 
orally argued cases), generally signify a less important or less contentious 
case than one decided in a signed opinion. And sometimes a case is 
dismissed in a per curiam opinion because a jurisdictional flaw was 
discovered after the case had been argued, so there is no decision on the 
merits to classify as liberal or conservative. 
We also divided the cases into finer subject matter areas. Table 4 lists 
the fraction of unanimous cases in each area, ranked from highest to lowest. 
TABLE 4: MEAN FRACTION OF UNANIMOUS DECISIONS ACROSS FINE SUBJECT AREAS 
Subject Area Mean Fraction Number of Cases 
Interstate Relations 0.41 56 
Judicial Power 0.41 943 
Federalism 0.33 336 
Attorneys 0.31 81 
Unions 0.29 332 
Economic Activity 0.29 1504 
Civil Rights 0.29 1124 
Privacy 0.28 90 
Federal Taxation 0.28 290 
Due Process 0.26 301 
Criminal Procedure 0.20 1539 
First Amendment 0.20 563 
Notes: 
(1) We excluded the Miscellaneous category because it contained only 17 cases. 
(2) The total number of cases is 7159. 
 
The four classes with fractions below the mean of .285—due process, 
criminal procedure, First Amendment, and privacy—are ideologically 
charged, but so are some of the classes with fractions at or above the mean, 
such as civil rights, unions, and federalism. 
We suggested earlier that if the ideological stakes in a case are small, 
even slight dissent aversion is likely to produce a unanimous decision. But 
the outcomes might still be correlated with the Court’s overall ideology. We 
test that hypothesis using two measures of ideology: the fraction of Justices 
appointed by Republican Presidents and the Justices’ median Segal–Cover 
scores.19 
 
19  Segal–Cover scores are estimates of a Supreme Court Justice’s ideology at the time of his 
appointment. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS 111–12 (2005); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559–61 (1989), updated in Jeffery A Segal, 
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Since the petitioner wins about 66% of the unanimous cases, we expect 
a negative coefficient on the variable denoting the ideological direction of 
the lower court decision; this is a high rate of reversals (though similar to 
the reversal rate for non-unanimous decisions) and we expect reversals to 
be heavily influenced by ideology because the Supreme Court has neither 
the time nor the inclination to correct merely technical errors by the lower 
courts. Testing this hypothesis requires estimating separate regressions for 
unanimous decisions in which there is, and unanimous decisions in which 
there is not, a lower court conflict; for if there is a conflict that the Supreme 
Court wants to resolve it is immaterial which side of the conflict the lower 
court was on. 
Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis. The ideological 
direction of the lower court decision is highly significant in regressions (1) 
and (2). And the effects are large. For example, a conservative (liberal) 
lower court decision reduces (increases) the probability of a conservative 
unanimous Supreme Court decision by between 0.42 and 0.44, holding the 
other variables constant. 
 
 
Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron & Harold J. Spaeth, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 813–15 (1995). Martin–Quinn scores are estimates of a 
Supreme Court Justice’s ideology as inferred from her judicial votes as a Supreme Court Justice. See 
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation Via Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 145–52 (2002); Andrew D. Martin & 
Kevin M. Quinn, Can Ideal Point Estimates be Used as Explanatory Variables? 1–2 (Oct. 8, 2005) 
(unpublished working paper), available at http://adm.wustl.edu/media/working/resnote.pdf. 
We experimented with two other measures of the court’s overall ideology—the median Justice 
Martin–Quinn score and the fraction of Justices who identified themselves as Republicans when they 
were appointed (this fraction was identical to the fraction appointed by a Republican President in the 
1990 to 2008 Terms but not the 1958 to 1989 Terms—for example, Justice Powell, appointed by Nixon, 
was a Democrat). These substitutions had only minor effects on the regressions. 
106:699  (2012) Even Unanimous Decisions 
 711 
TABLE 5: LOGIT ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL DIRECTION OF UNANIMOUS DECISIONS, 1946–
2009 TERMS 
Variables Fraction 
 Conservative Votes 
Fraction 
Conservative Votes 
 No Conflict in 
 Lower Courts 
Conflict in Lower Courts 

















 0.339**  
  (4.00) - 
0.465** 
(3.41) 
Ninth Circuit 0.124* (2.51) 






Civil Liberties 0.094 (1.33) 
























Observations        1189        1189         539         539 
Notes: 
(1) *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01. 
(2) The entries are marginal-effect coefficients at the mean values of all variables. 
(3) Federalism (and Miscellaneous) is again the omitted case category. 
(4) The ideological direction of the 1189 9–0 decisions (8–0 for the 1969 Term) is 
coded: 0 = liberal; 1 = conservative. 
(5) Standard errors are clustered by Term of Court (64 clusters, 1 for each Term). 
 
The coefficients on the two ideological measures (Fraction Republican 
and Segal–Cover Median) are positive, but the first is not statistically 
significant, and both have only small effects. The coefficients imply that a 
decline in the number of appointees of a Republican President from five to 
four would decrease the fraction of conservative unanimous decisions by 
between .015 (in equation (1), which holds constant the ideological 
direction of the lower court decision) and .026 (in equation (3), which is 
limited to cases in which there was a conflict in the lower courts). Neither 
effect is large relative to the .41 fraction of unanimous Supreme Court 
decisions that are conservative. But the predicted effects would be much 
larger if a Court consisting of eight Justices appointed by Republican 
presidents and one appointed by a Democratic president switched to eight 
Democratic appointees and one Republican appointee. That would reduce 
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the probability of a conservative unanimous decision by between .11 and 
.19 (27% and 46%, respectively, relative to the mean of .41). 
When we substitute the median Segal–Cover scores for the Fraction 
Republican variable, the coefficients on the Court’s ideology are more 
significant. Even though Segal–Cover scores are based on newspaper 
editorials prior to confirmation, they avoid the obvious errors of classifying 
Justices Brennan, Stevens, and Souter as conservative Justices just because 
Republican Presidents appointed them. 
Of the remaining variables in Table 5, cases from the Ninth Circuit are 
significantly more likely to be decided conservatively, holding constant the 
ideological direction of the Ninth Circuit decision. This effect, however, is 
not significant when there is a conflict in the lower courts (equations (3) 
and (4)); this is consistent with our distinction between conflict and 
nonconflict cases. The subject matter variables are generally not significant 
except for the increase in the probability of a conservative decision in 
judicial power cases in equations (1) and (2) but not (3) and (4). 
In short, ideology plays a small but still significant role in unanimous 
decisions. This is consistent with our theory and with the indirect evidence 
presented in Table 5 that decisions are unanimous when the ideological 
stakes are not large enough to lead a Justice who disagrees with the 
majority to dissent. 
Table 6 supplements the analysis by presenting some voting 
characteristics of the current Justices, plus Justice Souter, who was 
appointed in the same general period as Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer; we exclude Justices Stevens and O’Connor, who were appointed 
much earlier. The liberal Justices, plus Justice Thomas, have the highest 
combined percentage of votes for unanimous decisions and dissenting 
votes. The implication (ignoring Justice Thomas, an outlier in many 
respects) is that liberals are more inclined to join decisions that do not 
present significant ideological stakes, and more inclined to dissent in cases 
that do present such stakes because the Court is predominantly 
conservative; this may explain Justice Stevens’s voting pattern noted at the 
beginning of this Essay. 
Justice Kennedy, the swing Justice, gets his way most of the time: he 
dissents the least among the Justices and writes or joins concurring opinions 
rarely. Justice Scalia—arguably the Court’s intellectual leader—writes or 
joins concurring opinions the most. Justice Roberts is the second-least-
frequent dissenter, and writes or joins the fewest concurring opinions, 
perhaps in order to signal that as Chief Justice he usually gets his way or 
that he seeks, by his example, to promote consensus. 
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TABLE 6: VOTES BY RECENTLY APPOINTED JUSTICES (BEGINNING WITH JUSTICE SOUTER) 
Name Percentage of 
Justice’s 






Votes in All 
Cases 
Percentage of  
Justice’s 
Concurring 








Alito 0.374 0.159 0.123 0.124 
Breyer 0.421 0.207 0.118 0.112 
Ginsburg 0.420 0.217 0.098 0.111 
Kennedy 0.413 0.097 0.096 0.077 
Roberts 0.391 0.122 0.063 0.056 
Scalia 0.405 0.178 0.155 0.164 
Sotomayor 0.424 0.227 0.106 0.107 
Souter 0.419 0.182 0.094 0.109 
Thomas 0.421 0.202 0.144 0.148 
 
To conclude, this Essay has established the existence of an ideology 
effect in unanimous decisions, but a weaker one than in non-unanimous 
decisions, of the Supreme Court. These findings are consistent with a 
realistic conception of the Court as a mixed ideological–legalistic judicial 
institution. 
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